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 **ROYAL
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**Tedder Academy
of Leadership**

The Tedder Talks 2021 – Leadership and Decision Making: Summary Paper

Dr Craig Marsh and Wing Commander Simon Meade O.B.E, R.A.F.

Interviewees:

Navdeep Arora, formerly Senior Partner, McKinsey

Sergeant Ali Beer, RAF Mountain Rescue Team

Gp. Capt. Simon Dowling, RAF

Amanda Fisher, CEO, Amey

Kate Goodger, Sports Psychologist

Rear Admiral Andy Kyte, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Support Operations)
& Chief Naval Logistics Officer

Diane Lees, Director General, Imperial War Museums

Air Commodore Suraya Marshall, Commandant, RAF Cranwell

Air Marshal Gerry Mayhew, Deputy Commander, Operations, HQ Air Command

Blair Sheppard, Global Partner, PWC

Clive Vacher, CEO, De La Rue

Interviewer:

Dr. Craig Marsh, Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Director,
Lincoln International Business School, University of Lincoln

Introduction

This paper summarises the key themes emerging from the RAF Tedder Academy of Leadership / University of Lincoln “Tedder Talks”, a series of short video interviews with a diverse group of leaders from inside and outside the RAF conducted using an online platform over the spring of 2021. The purpose of the interviews was to explore the experience of leaders in the decisions they make. It is designed to accompany the library of interviews, available on the Tedder and University website, each around 20 minutes long, and a summary video highlighting the main themes from the interviews, conducted by Group Captain Emma Keith, Commandant of the Tedder Academy of Leadership, RAFC Cranwell, and Dr. Craig Marsh.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first discusses the broader context of decision making, touching on themes of speed, uncertainty, ethics, culture, and sustainability. The second section outlines the insights that emerged as leaders described the organisational context of their decisions, balancing structures and processes for ensuring effective decision making with the need to retain flexibility, discretion and empowerment of the individual. In the third section we describe individual factors in decision making, in particular how they use data analysis and evidence to support their decisions, and the counterbalancing roles of internal psychology, intuition, and emotional intelligence. Finally we sum up the paper with six lessons for leadership.

1. The Broader Context Of Decision Making

Blair Sheppard outlines four global crises that, in his view, senior leaders need to be aware of when considering the decisions they make, that are known trends, obvious from the evidence, and therefore relevant to all discussion about strategic purpose and direction. The first three all have similar characteristics, he says; they are a problem now, they will get worse, and if not addressed they will make the world 'very dark in around a decade'. These are 1) a crisis of prosperity; most people think that future prospects are worse than current reality, largely as a result of disparity between people, regions, and generations, the results of which are that people 'stop trying'. 2) A crisis of technology, of which there are two parts, the first being an industrial system that has CO₂ as a by-product, and the second, a technology system where advances in AI make it increasingly difficult to audit, measure and manage the impact of it. 3) A crisis in institutions; people have lost faith in them. Only 18% of people in a global survey reported trust in their institutions.

The fourth crisis he defines is one of leadership, which we will return to later.

There are several consequences for organisations of this overview of global crises, but two of the most important ones are first, that the purpose, the 'why' question, within which strategic decisions are made, should be directed - if we believe in a fundamental goal of improving society - toward (in some way relevant to the organisation) a broad purpose in helping to resolve these crises. Decision making becomes a question then of building capability where needed to resolve them and allocating scarce resources to the right places to support that capability.

The second is that these crises are time-critical, and increase the complexity of strategic decisions for leaders. The traditional separation of strategy and execution, the thought that you can take time to think out your direction first and then execute on it, no longer exists.

The global pandemic has highlighted this tenet, that is, that strategic decisions are more time critical than previously experienced and are often made in the face of impending crises, the 'answers' to which are to say the least not readily available, and the decisions being made more often than not, therefore, unprecedented. Covid-19 has therefore naturally formed an important context, almost a testing ground, for the effectiveness of decision-making processes that several leaders referred to.

Suraya Marshall described the combination of the essential speed and agility of decisions needed at the outset of the crisis, often based on poor or insufficient evidence, the need to rely on instinct for the right decision, the overriding requirement to ensure decisions were reviewed regularly and changed if needs demanded, the importance of wide consultation where possible, and the imperative for 'hearts and minds' - bringing people with you on decisions even though she was observing a very broad range of reactions and needs to the crisis. These themes form a consistent 'red thread' in the responses of our leaders.

Andy Kyte also described the overriding need for the preservation of speed and agility of decisions in the context of such strategic uncertainty, and in particular the instinctive, intuitive understanding of which decisions do need taking immediately and which can be delayed or consulted on. He defined two categories of decision - the 'go with your instinct and decide now' (while still balancing risks and evidence available). If there is time, then the question is how long you have to make it and therefore the extent to which you can gather evidence, consult, or allow others to make it for you. Often, he simply 'knows' what the right decision is and he is conscious then of making sure this is communicated clearly and staff time isn't wasted on further reflection or discussion. The time-critical nature of decisions in the pandemic made him realise that too often we perhaps search for a 'comfort blanket' of further discussion and analysis of a decision when the decision is already clear and any further analysis is a waste of time and effort.

Amanda Fisher saw the context of the crisis as an opportunity to speed up her transformation agenda, precisely because no-one could gainsay her with the narrative of 'this is the way we do things round here', as the time was, literally, unprecedented. The toughest decision she made in this context was a counter intuitive one, that is to protect, and in some cases improve, the finances of her employees precisely at the moment when other organisations were cutting back, recognising that the pandemic had its greatest impact on the individual via the uncertainty it created about their own financial security. Furthermore it came in the context of what she described as a 'wrong' decision, to do the opposite; but having listened to the perspective of her employees she publicly admitted it was the wrong, and changed it.

Gerry Mayhew explored a different contextual aspect to strategic decision making, that of political oversight. He pointed out that senior leadership is in the position that they make some decisions that affect government; that is, how the prime minister and his government are perceived. The risk of this oversight if not handled carefully is that senior leaders do not assume ownership, as they should, of key decisions. Gerry describes how he incorporates an awareness of political intent - and he stressed the use of 'awareness' - as a crucial part of the context of his decisions, even to the extent of sometimes appearing 'odd' to his organisation, requiring him wherever possible to explain this context so other echelons can make the right decision in context and therefore bring them with him in the process; all the while making sure that he retains the context to make, and take ownership, of the decision regardless of political oversight. Again, he sees the Covid crisis offering the opportunity to improve the use of virtual tools to aid this communication process. The additional benefit of this awareness and communication of a political context, he says, is that people will feel more able to inform him and feedback - thus improving future decisions.

Clive Vacher, whose company operates in many countries, some of them unstable politically, notes the importance of ethical and moral considerations in this context. The nature of his business (to return to the importance of a clarity of purpose noted above) means that he can assist them in their political and economic development, and not just (to put it crudely) make money by printing money for them. But it also entails the highest level of ethical behaviour; 'staying away from the grey', as he terms it. This is enacted through a central set of policies and procedures that are 'must haves' or 'must dos'; a framework that any country manager or factory manager operates within. However, the power is in the local application of this global policy, that entails a reasonable amount of flexibility for local decisions to be culturally and environmentally specific; but the decisions will never breach global policy on ethics, diversity, bribery, corruption and so on.

Clive also mentions another key contextual factor in global decisions - sustainability. His framework for decision making now takes into account environmental impact, even down to the choice of ingredients for a particular product. Interestingly far from these strict global policies 'feeling' like restraints on business he identifies them as a key competitive advantage, allowing him to distinguish his company's offer above others.

It would be entirely expected that culture should also play an important role in setting the context for decision making, and the effects of culture were highlighted by Simon Dowling in discussing his time at NATO. His role was to arbitrate between the 28 nations (as it was then), and he describes how a clear prior understanding of the historical, political, and cultural standpoint of each of those nations' representatives aided the discussions that led to - in this case - consensus decisions. This understanding would modify the language, timing, and approach he would take to each representative. He also discussed the role that our natural tendency to stereotype on national cultural lines played; his experience suggested that a lack of awareness of for example different approaches to timekeeping would certainly be detrimental to effective decision making. Such awareness reduces your chances of making a faux pas in the first place, and this allows you then to build on this and develop a more nuanced ('second level') understanding of differences taking into account individual personalities, and the factors mentioned above.

2. Organisational Factors.

Many of the senior leaders interviewed described the strategies they used to translate these contextual factors into organisational frameworks and processes for effective decision making.

Diane Lees talked about the risks to decision making posed by running a large, complex, and widely distributed organisation in which silos can develop if hierarchy is too influential, and individuals lose creative and diverse input into the decision-making process. A key criterion for her therefore is to create a decision governance structure founded on the principle of cross department, and cross-level, working. Critical, also, for her, is that there is transparency through the organisation about where decisions are made and who is accountable for them; to show who and where decisions are made.

Care, also, should be taken, in her view, that accountability for decisions is not seen as a reason to hide behind process. She gave the example of copyright; it would be easy for her people to say 'we don't have the copyright, we can't use the image', even when the image may, if a solution can be found, beneficial to the museum's customers. Her perspective is that encouraging creative discussions around a solution with the right people at the right time, is the cultural antidote to this 'hiding behind process' risk of clear accountability (the right decisions, not blind decisions).

Suraya Marshall discussed in this context the RAF concept of Mission Command, the structure that in theory defines strategic intent then empowers individuals to make decisions within this structure. However, in practice she highlights that some individuals don't feel comfortable in being empowered to make decisions, sometimes intent is not that clear and rank and hierarchy can also count against this when tradition used to, and still does occasionally, dictate that decisions are systematically referred up the 'chain of command'. For her the key antidote is creating a culture in which it's OK to make the wrong decision and it doesn't affect them personally and individually, recognising in practice that this is hard to get right. It behoves in her view senior leaders to behave in such a way that respects and recognises the ability and desire of more junior ranks to make decisions that may not be exactly the way they would have done it, but that you can live with; otherwise you risk disempowering them to make decisions.

Gerry Mayhew developed this theme; he described the mechanism as one in which senior leaders strive to provide annual, quarterly, and sometimes weekly context and a 'broad idea of where you want to end up' to the organisation, that allows those inside to make their decisions with the right information available to them. This requires 'real discipline' to allow, facilitate and help decisions to be made lower down; the antithesis of the 'long screwdriver' phenomenon, that is, senior leaders reaching down through the ranks to make decisions that should rightly be left to others.

In the private sector, two CEOs picked up on the empowerment theme and described how they implemented a decision-making structure as a strategic tool for transforming the organisations they took over. Clive Vacher characterised this as 'harvesting the intelligence of the organisation through the decision making process' in order to turn his company into a thriving sustainable and growing business. He brought together a team of 18 key leaders for three months, with a commitment to spending 12 hours a week. Their task was to develop a singular vision for the organisation, and make key strategic decisions for it (what business to focus on, what to drop, where to invest). It was a shared decision-making process and this is his principle of decision making, to work together on the key ones. Previously there had been little alignment, and the first task was to get to know each other better, partly by reading a management text together¹. They then stripped out emotions from the process, relied on facts and evidence first, and only then allowed opinions to intervene. In certain key decisions they spent three weeks on the discussion. Having done so, they found that execution of the decision was far quicker. Each representative of the team was tasked with ensuring that every part of the organisation was represented, such that all employees had a voice in the decisions the team was making. As Clive said, when the organisation makes the decision, buy-in is never a problem.

1 'American Icon: Alan Mulally and the Fight to save Ford Motor Company' (Bryce Hoffman), 2012, Crown Business

Amanda Fisher also intended her organisation to be more modern and progressive, prioritising, in the decision-making structure she implemented, a change in culture to collaboration and communication, while remaining as CEO connected to the operations of her business, and ensuring that the Board were also kept 'real and honest', avoiding the trap of disconnecting her decisions from the Board's and those that benefitted the business. These principles changed how she thought of the decision-making process. She identified people throughout her business as 'change makers' who would help her with decisions that needed to be made; to feedback how they would land, how they should be communicated; and fundamentally to help shape them based on this feedback. Her new strategy based on this initiative became 'freedom to perform', signalling a culture change from an old top - down decision-making process, and recognising decisions should be made at the front end of the business, by those who have the best information and the right context. Accountability and responsibility followed, but also important were three underlying principles ('empowerment', 'engagement' and 'to excel').

Although Amanda steered away from a definition of values, the principled approach she describes clearly maintained an implicit recognition of the importance of ethics, and questions of rightness and wrongness, in the decision structure she created. Naturally this was a regular theme of the interviews. At the Imperial War Museum Diane Lees described the 'empathy check' embedded in their decision-making process, essential (for example) given their role in handling sensitive material related to the memories of individuals and the nation. This is one of their four values, along with 'being courageous', 'speaking from an evidence base', and 'being relevant'. These fit into job descriptions as well as decision making; she describes these as an 'instinct' built into their training, always to consider empathy whenever decisions are made. This becomes most difficult when there is a commercial element also involved, for example in sales, and there is often a tension between the need to make money on a product and apply the empathy check (say) to a relative who wishes to access material owned by the museum (value, vs. Values).

Suraya Marshall highlighted the importance of the RISE values (Respect, Integrity, Service, Excellence) as an underpinning element in the RAF's decision making, and a key part of phase 1 training for officers that defines the responsibility and commitment that comes with these values.

These values are particularly significant when they are weighed, in her view, by the cultural imperative for diversity in decision making that militates against homogeneity of decisions, and demands the incorporation of different understandings and experiences - cognitive diversity. She argues that when you're in the majority then decisions made are, or at least perceived, to be in favour of the majority. Diversity and inclusion in the decision-making process therefore has the added benefit, not only of improving the quality of decision making, but also minimising the risk of the unintended consequence of certain groups being disenfranchised from or by decisions.

Clive Vacher entirely reflected this position, that increasing the cognitive and cultural diversity and breadth of perspectives (and, in turn, the ambiguity of choices) into the decision-making process forces you down a path of much greater diligence in analysing aspects of your decision. In other words, it encourages you, the decision maker, to reflect on your own world view, potentially take longer to make the decision, and perhaps force you to say 'actually my world view is perhaps not the optimal one'. There is nothing more powerful, he says, 'than being in a room of many viewpoints, who with respect to each other, and in good faith, are working to a single solution'. For all major decisions on strategy therefore he makes sure that all elements of the organisation are included.

Many of our interviewees referred to the importance, touched on by Clive above, of building into decision-making the process of challenge to decisions, particularly as a counterweight to perceptions of the authority of more senior ranks, or to the biases inherent in all of us as we make decisions founded in our own worldview. Andy Kyte for example describes the relationship between him and his people as a form of unwritten contract, driven by the principle of empowerment, entailing agreement that they will be given the skill and the freedom to make decisions in context, that they are comfortable in doing so, but that they will also agree to challenge decisions appropriately (in both directions) so that all options are explored. Clearly there is a time and a place for doing this; particularly on operations clear decision and execution is critical. Outside that there is more room for challenge, but the parameters need to be

set. Leaders need to be comfortable with it, and subordinates also comfortable with the freedom to do so (and to be challenged back). Subject matter experts (SMEs) he says are crucial to empower them to challenge in the decision-making process.

We were also fortunate in the interviews to have an example of where the lack of challenge to decisions was possibly the crucial factor, from several, in the process going spectacularly wrong. Navdeep Arora was a senior partner at McKinsey until a conviction for fraud saw him being imprisoned for two years. His diagnosis of the organisational factors that led to his conviction touch on all the factors we have mentioned so far, but show where they can fail. He describes a culture in which 'values' were discussed, but did not in fact inform behaviour or decision making. Values, he says, need to form 'guard rails' for decisions, showing what can be done in service of client value, and equally what cannot. Eventually value (cost benefit analysis) becomes the default decision making framework at the expense of other considerations, even ethical ones (which are never as black and white as cost related ones in his view).

What would have mitigated this organisational failure, in his view would, and is, precisely to elevate such ambiguous or confusing decisions from the individual to the group level. The diversity and challenge that this wider perspective brings minimises the chances of the decision being 'warped or skewed' by the individual's own biases and perceptions. Organisation values, in their view, are often simply 'window dressing', unless you see them being enacted in decisions and reinforced by employees by both what they choose to do, and what they choose not to do (for instance challenging decisions that are not in line with those values).

3. Individual Factors In Decision Making

Continuing with Navdeep's interview, the intense self-reflection and broader research that he has completed since his conviction has also led him to identify six personal or individual traits or 'triggers' that he believes led to the decision he took that was later found to be illegal and have led others similarly. These he discovered were the characteristics that lead a small handful of individuals to 'cross the ethical or legal line' in their decisions, when most, when faced with similar pressures, do not. These are

1. Burden of custodianship: a perceived responsibility for diverse stakeholders, and our own perception that we're failing to meet their expectations. One important consequence is we tend to isolate ourselves or feel alone with this burden. Perception of time pressure can also exacerbate this trait.
2. Fear of failure: the need for self-preservation, fear of losing one's reputation or status, and occasionally fear of losing a financial incentive (greed is a motive in only a small number of cases).
3. Ego and hubris: derived from a record of success, and from perceived invincibility.
4. Overcompensation for perceived deficiencies: decisions made were proxies for perceived shortcomings.
5. Lack of information capacity: regulatory boundaries can and are changing so rapidly that there can be confusion between right and wrong.
6. Personal beliefs and values: a small percentage of people, even after time in prison, still believe they were right in what they did (not relevant to Navdeep's own case).

Kate Goodger, in her role as a performance psychologist, was able to describe in some detail for us the intensely personal characteristics that contribute to effective decision making in elite sportsmen and women, with some striking parallels or crossovers to the world of work. She describes five major areas of influence on the decisions they make (psychological, physical, technical, tactical, and history/lifestyle), all of which require preparation and training, and athletes are coached and developed to understand their own unique combination of influences that allow them to make the right decisions under pressure (in competition), or to make them automatically. However, the decisions they make in planning - often in a four or eight year planning cycle - are equally important and based on a thorough process of preparation.

These two quite different decision-making cycles she says are both anchored by a clear sense of purpose, defined succinctly by a question she quotes from a book² - “will it make the boat go faster?” In other words, if the decision is not aiding their performance then the factor needs to be eliminated. For her, therefore, a prime goal with her coaching is to make sure the athlete is totally clear on their performance aim, and their decisions therefore evaluated as to whether they support that aim, or not.

A further, important nuance to this clarity of purpose is that if the aim is a medal, then there is often a degree of emotional labour entailed in such an aim; whereas if the aim is more internal (‘be the best I can be’) then this allows more objectivity in the decision-making process. One might also surmise that this objectivity in aim would help in avoiding some of the pitfalls identified by Navdeep’s analysis, noted above.

One clear crossover between business and sport that Kate describes is the ‘test and learn’ cycle; that is, using data and evidence to test a particular aspect of their performance, use it to make a decision to adjust and improve that aspect of performance, and repeat, in a series of small units or cycles that feedback to the athlete and inform future performance decisions.

Her insight into the use of data to drive future decisions, to ‘test and learn’, is reflected in the observations from several of our senior leaders who highlight the importance in particular of being open about the imperfection of the decision-making process and being prepared to adjust or change those decisions in the light of new evidence or feedback. Amanda Fisher publicly admitted that one of her key decisions in the early stages of her tenure (and the pandemic) was wrong, and in the light of feedback data and evidence from her organisation, she changed it. Suraya Marshall talks about ‘red teaming’ her thinking to provide more rigour in the decision-making process. And Gerry Mayhew highlights the capacity he draws upon in the wider organisation as a feedback loop and a source for making better future decisions.

A common theme throughout the interviews and seems to be a core question for all our decision makers, is the extent to which they rely on facts or evidence for their decision making, and the extent they use intuition or instinct to make the correct decision. All reflected on their efforts to get this balance right; all said that both evidence and intuition have a key role to play in decision making.

Andy Kyte emphasised that using evidence and data to underpin decisions is even more important now than it’s ever been. Historically he could remember a time when evidence available for decisions was much more scarce. Now, and the pandemic brought this into clear focus, fewer resources and the requirement for more time critical, rapid decisions, highlight just how critical it is to have the right data, at the right time, presented in the right format, combined with the crucial skill to interpret it. Leaders need to be able to go out and state what data sets they need for the decisions they have to make, and quickly.

Diane Lees highlighted the importance of the authority that a particular data set needs to carry for it to be used for making decisions, reflecting the emphasis on the role that the subject matter expert (SME) plays. In her example, no business case can be submitted for decision in her organisation without the financials being signed off by her finance department. All leaders therefore can be assured in this case that the decisions they’re making are based on reliable data.

Amanda Fisher says she has also always relied on data and evidence to make her decisions. However, self-awareness and emotional intelligence also ‘kicks in’ that allows her to listen to and rely on a sixth sense that guides her when she gets to the critical ‘should I or shouldn’t I’ point of decision. To her, if something doesn’t seem right or feel right then it probably isn’t right - and vice versa even when all the ‘facts’ possibly point in the other direction. Equally she highlights the risk of unconscious bias leading her in the wrong direction, so it is essential in her view to have gone through a rigorous process of analysis before arriving at this moment.

2 ‘Will it Make the Boat Go Faster?’ (Ben Hunt-Davis and Harriet Beveridge), 2011, Matador

Suraya Marshall also describes how decision making can become more intuitive as you gain more experience as a leader because you've probably seen something like this situation before, and therefore you know instinctively what the right decision should be. However, she also states that it is at this point that it's particularly important to consult more broadly, and to have prepared the ground as it were by recruiting a team to consult with who have the ability and courage to identify possible flaws in your thinking, who have perhaps a different way of looking and seeing the world and may therefore challenge your instincts. This, combined with the key point that you retain ownership over the decision itself, also builds engagement around your team because they've effectively contributed to and influenced your decision-making process. One is reminded here of the old saw, that in organisations when two people agree all the time, one of them is unnecessary.

Our interviews also encompassed a member of the RAF's Mountain Rescue Team, Ali Beer, who was able to recount two case study examples illustrating in practice this fine balance between evidence and intuition 'on the ground', as it were, when lives were at stake from the decisions he was taking. In one case, he was able to find, and save, a missing elderly patient with Alzheimer's. Having discovered the patient lying in a water-filled ditch, with a chest injury, he had to balance the 'gold standard' of how to deal with such a situation, the evidence he was presented with, and a time-critical decision about how best to recover him given this evidence. This evidence - of a possible serious injury - should have led him, based on the 'gold standard', to await full medical support (casualty wrap system to insulate, vacuum mattress stretcher, collar, so they're warm, immobilised and able to evacuate). He had a range of recovery options available and had to make a decision based on what he saw as the optimal solution for this patient and in these circumstances.

He made it clear that it was down to him to make the decision to recover and when, but he discussed the decision with those around him. For him the key message is weighing up the information you have available to you against the time available to make the decision; it is better in his view to make an imperfect decision in the right time, than wait longer for all the information to become available to you, when it may be too late. It is worth noting again the training and practice that the MRT regularly engage in to refine this process of decision making.

Intuition also played a role in the successful recovery, particularly in the first key decision on where and how to look for the patient. Knowing something about the tendency of Alzheimer's patients to follow linear features, and an instinct of where to look, he was able to locate the patient in the dark, in a ditch.

It has often been noted that instinct or intuition, sometimes described as a 'sixth sense', is in fact a rapid processing of data by the five senses that happens subconsciously and is refined by training and experience, leading one to the 'feeling' that it is the right decision to make. This analysis of instinct would certainly be borne out from our interviewees' descriptions of the important, but carefully bounded, role of intuition in the decision-making process.

4. Summary: Lessons For Leadership

In the section on global context for decisions Blair Sheppard outlined four global crises, the fourth of which is a crisis of leadership. Acknowledging an ambiguous and uncertain environment, in which many of the challenges leaders face overlap and provide no obvious path to a solution, previous models of leadership, in his view, no longer pertain. He argues that in the Covid pandemic, leaders who were acknowledged to have navigated it successfully, probably demonstrated six important traits, each of which are in and of themselves paradoxes.

The first trait is that of the **'humble hero'**: leaders are likely to have admitted that they had no idea on how to deal with this issue, and therefore sought input from many experts; and having done so, they still had little idea what the correct decision was. This is then balanced, paradoxically, with that of courage, for example to be able to make a decision regardless of the uncertainty faced.

In similar vein he identifies five other traits, all of them requiring skilfully balancing elements that have traditionally been seen as opposing, that define the expertise of the modern leader:

2. **'Tech-savvy humanist'**. Traditionally, those leaders with valuable technical skill were less able to evaluate the impact of technology on people. The modern leader is able to balance both in the decisions they make.
3. **'Traditioned innovator'**. This defines the ability to combine the non-negotiable modern leadership capacity to drive innovation through decision making with a deep understanding of the history, culture, and ethos of the organisation, and therefore framing those decisions with the knowledge of what is valuable to preserve from the past.
4. **'High integrity politician'**. Modern leaders need to be equipped with the wiles of a politician: balancing a variety of points of view, building coalitions, and navigating complex relationships to get things done. It is essential however to be able to retain a strong sense of integrity in decision making, as people will not follow leaders they do not trust.
5. **'Globally-minded localist'**. The ability to understand and react to global trends and challenges emerged as a key leadership trait in the 20th Century. Now, as the world fragments into regional or local perspectives on how organisations should be run, this 'global mindset' needs to be balanced with the ability to make effective decisions relevant to a local context.
6. **'Strategic executor'**. Usually leaders have an orientation in their decision making toward either strategy or execution, and the two decision processes are often defined differently. The modern world however now presents multiple urgent issues to the leader to be resolved, which need to be done in the context of defining a strategic direction, without which swift execution creates a higher probability of a more significant future crisis.